

Towards an Authentication Service for Peer-to-Peer based MMVEs



p@p

Arno Wacker^{*}, Gregor Schiele[◆],
Sebastian Schuster^{*}, and Torben Weis^{*}

^{*}University of Duisburg–Essen
Duisburg, Germany

[◆]University of Mannheim
Mannheim, Germany

Overview

- Motivation
- Assumptions
- Moderated vs. Open MMVEs
- Requirements
- Our Approach for an Authentication Service
- Properties
- Conclusion & Future Work

Motivation

- Security **crucial requirement** for MMVEs
- Open (i.e. general access) network
 - Untrusted network environment (e.g. the Internet)
→ potential threats from **outside the MMVE**
- (Potentially) open large user base
 - Untrusted users
→ potential threats from **within the MMVE**
- Goal: provide **authentication service**
 - Once this is achieved, other services can be added

Assumptions

- **P2P communication**
 - Send/receive messages
 - Multi-hop routing using overlay
- **Distributed Hash Table (DHT)**
 - Store/retrieve/remove globally available data
 - Consistency and persistency
 - E.g. CAN, Chord
- **Honest user majority**
 - Small fraction of malicious users

Moderated vs. Open MMVEs

We distinguish between two types of environments:

- **Moderated MMVE:**
 - An operator, e.g. a game provider, releases a new game
 - Mandatory registration with the game provider
 - Game fee depending on playing time etc.
- **Open MMVE:**
 - There is no operator
 - Managed by the virtual community itself
- Both pose different challenges

Requirements



- **Decentralized Operation**
 - High **costs** for operating a server
 - No bandwidth-**bottleneck**
 - No **single point of failure**
- **Privacy**
 - MMVE users should remain **anonymous** to each other
 - However, the **MMVE operator** may reveal the identities
- **Availability**
 - Authentication is a crucial service for MMVEs
 - **Log-in** to the system should **always** be **possible**

Authentication Goals

- **Moderated MMVEs:**
 - Only **registered users** can participate in the MMVE
 - I.e. those who paid
 - Prevent **identity theft**
 - Personification of other users
- **Open MMVEs:**
 - Existing MMVE identity **cannot be removed** by other users
 - Prevent **identity theft**

Moderated P2P-based MMVEs

- **Goal:**
 - Only registered users participate
 - Prevent identity theft
- **Approach:**
 - Classical approach with certificates
 - Operator is CA and assigns certificate to user's MMVE identity
 - Certificate is well-known by game software
 - To access MMVE client signs messages
 - Peers can check validity through checking the certificate
 - Revocation with revocation list in the DHT



Open P2P-based MMVEs (1 / 2)

- **Goal:**
 - Prevent **identity theft**
- **Certificates not applicable, thus:**
 - Public keys stored on **set of peers in DHT**
 - **Set size selectable** (security level s) → tolerate s attackers
 - **Majority voting** to determine valid public key
- **Note:**
 - Risk inversely proportional to network size
 - **Evenly distributing** DHT hash function required
 - Peer-id must **not be selectable** by user


Open P2P-based MMVEs (2/2)

1. Registration of a new user

- Stores own public key in the DHT
- Replicated $2s+1$ times
- Well know positions, e.g. derived from MMVE identity

2. Log-In/Communication

- Other users can find public key
- At least $(s+1)$ retrieved values must match (majority)
- Proceed with signing each message



Properties

- **Decentralized Operation:**
 - Moderated MMVEs: no server needed at runtime
 - Open MMVEs: no server needed at any time
- **Privacy:**
 - Achieved through usage of an MMVE identity
- **Availability:**
 - Registration in mod. MMVEs depends on operator's server
 - Registration in open MMVEs always available
 - Log-in always available (moderated and open)

Conclusion

- **Authentication Service for P2P-based MMVEs**
 - For moderated MMVEs:
 - Resembles closely PKI mechanism (operator as CA)
 - For open MMVEs:
 - Uses the DHT to store public keys
 - Uses replication to prevent manipulation
 - Tolerates up to s compromised peers (security level)
- **Current & future work:**
 - Implementation underway in the peers@play project
- **Open issues:**
 - Secure relocation of DHT content (open MMVEs)

Thank you for your attention!

Arno Wacker

arno.wacker@uni-duisburg-essen.de

- **Towards an Authentication Service for Peer-to-Peer based Massively Multiuser Virtual Environments**
Arno Wacker, Gregor Schiele, Sebastian Schuster, and Torben Weis
To appear in: Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Massively Multiuser Virtual Environments, organized at the IEEE Virtual Reality 2008, Reno, Nevada, USA, March 2008
- **Consistency Management for Peer-to-Peer-based Massively Multiuser Virtual Environments**
Gregor Schiele, Richard Süselbeck, Arno Wacker, Tonio Triebel, and Christian Becker
To appear in: Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Massively Multiuser Virtual Environments, organized at the IEEE Virtual Reality 2008, Reno, Nevada, USA, March 2008
- **Decentralized bootstrapping in pervasive applications**
Mirko Knoll, Arno Wacker, Gregor Schiele, Torben Weis
In: Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom 07), Work in Progress Session, White Plains, NY, USA, March 2007
- **Requirements of Peer-to-Peer-based Massively Multiplayer Online Gaming**
Gregor Schiele, Richard Sueselbeck, Arno Wacker, Joerg Haehner, Christian Becker, Torben Weis
In: Proceedings of the Seventh International Workshop on Global and Peer-to-Peer Computing, organized at the IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid 2007 (CCGRID 2007), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, May 2007